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Central Asia’s Aral Sea crisis represents a disaster of monumental proportions, a tragedy for
both the region’s ecology and its human inhabitants. While the human and natural
environments had operated in a sustainable co-joined system for millennia, Tsarist Russian
expansion into Central Asia, followed by Soviet expansion of both the cotton industry and
unsustainable irrigation practices to anchor it spelled doom for the Aral Sea. Today, many
of the political and economic stimuli for such misguided practices continue, as do the
continued retreat of the Sea and the proliferation of poor human health. The Aral Sea crisis
has received ample scholarly attention, though somewhat surprising is a relative dearth of
research explicitly investigating the nature, variety, and directionality of nature–society
linkages today within the region. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the contem-
porary nature–society linkages operating within the Aral Sea region of Central Asia.
Historical nexuses will provide necessary background, and the linkages operating currently
within the spheres of regional economy, human health, and political considerations will be
detailed. Couching the current crisis within the framework of coupled human–environ-
ment system contexts reveals a region in which these linkages are largely inextricable. This
paper concludes with a call for a reconsideration of the nature-society linkages and
a greater emphasis placed on the local region’s ecological and social sustainability.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The Aral Sea tragedy provides the most striking example of
the interconnections between the health of an ecosystem
and that of the economy, community, and people depen-
dent on that ecosystem. (Postel, 2000, p. 943)3272 40 43 44.
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sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Ha1. IntroductionThe Aral Sea, straddling the border separating western
Kazakhstan and northwestern Uzbekistan, needs little by
way of introduction. Once the world’s fourth-largest inland
water body, the Aral today is a shriveled, fragmented series
of no fewer than six distinct water bodies dotting a desic-
cated landscape. These remains represent a monumental
disaster, the scope and scale of which have few parallels in
human history. The largely anthropogenic origin of this
disaster has been well chronicled within a broad array of
literature (Bissell, 2003; Feshbach & Friendly, 1992; Glantz,
1999; Micklin, 1988; Spoor, 1998). Receiving somewhat
less attention has been the important, though admittedly
much smaller, inﬂuence played by the region’s arid clim-
atic environment, sparse precipitation, and high summernyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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a treatment). The purpose of this paper is to couch the Aral
Sea disaster and its contemporary political, economic, and
human health manifestations within the multidisciplinary
framework of the interrelationship between humans and
the natural environment. This analytical framework,
referred to here as nature–society linkages, forms an
academic pillar within the discipline of geography, as well
as political, landscape, and human ecology, sustainability
science, and coupled human and natural systems (CHANS).
Over the past ﬁve decades, this paradigm has evolved from
a recognition of the bidirectional relationship between two
linked though distinct entities (see e.g. Pattison, 1964), to
a treatment of a symbiotic, coupled human-environment
system (e.g. Turner et al., 2003). Given the exhaustive
examination of the Aral Sea crisis and the ascendancy of the
analysis of nature–society relationships, the relative
paucity of academic literature explicitly joining these
themes is surprising. This paper seeks to ﬁll that scholarly
void.
What follows begins with a brief overview of the Aral
Sea region, followed by a historical account of this region
highlighting the interaction between the regional human
populations and the natural physical environment.
Contemporary nature–society links, compartmentalized
within economic concerns, human health issues, and
political considerations, are next discussed, followed by
a treatment of linkages operating between these three
dimensions. An analysis of the multitude of links will
demonstrate the inextricable nature of these connections,
and that indeed, what exists here is a tightly co-joined
coupled human–environment system. The connections
within this system have not been fully appreciated, and
today continue to be neglected. This paper will argue that
policy prescriptions aimed at improving the overall situa-
tion in the Aral Sea region must recognize and consider
these interdependencies. Nothing less than the region’s
environmental and social sustainability is at stake.
2. The region
The Aral Sea, in reality a landlocked terminal lake with
no outﬂow (Micklin, 1988), is located within the arid
environs of Central Asia (Fig. 1). The immediate region
anchors an eye-shaped expanse of midlatitude desert
(Koppën classiﬁcation BWk), formed primarily by the Qizl
Qum (red sand) and Kara Kum (black sand) deserts. Ringing
Central Asia’s desert environment are swaths of midlati-
tude steppe (Koppën’s BSk) to the north and east, and
subtropical steppe (BSh) to the south and east. Far to the
Aral’s east and southeast are situated the great orographic
masses (Koppën’s H) forming the headwaters of Central
Asia’s major river systems, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.
These rivers together account for the only inﬂow (surface
precipitation and groundwater contributions are minimal)
of water to the Aral Sea. The Syr Darya (Jaxartes of antiq-
uity) originates in the Tien Shan mountains of easternmost
Kyrgyzstan near the Kyrgyz–Chinese border. Flowing west
across Kyrgyzstan, the Naryn and Kara Darya join in
Uzbekistan’s densely populated Ferghana Valley, forming
the main Syr Darya that continues across northernmostTajikistan reentering Uzbekistan and ﬂowing northwest
through Kazakhstan, emptying into the Aral Sea. Referring
to the Aral Sea as a single contiguous entity, however, is
a misnomer. By the late 1980s, the receding Aral had split
into the “Little” Aral to the north and “Big” Aral to the south
(see e.g. Micklin, 2006). Today, the Syr Darya empties into
the “Little” Aral situated entirely within Kazakhstan’s
Kyzlorda oblast.
The Amu Darya (famed Oxus of antiquity) originates
in easternmost Afghanistan in the peaks of the Hindu
Kush. Flowing generally westward, the great river forms
much of the boundary between Afghanistan and Tajikistan,
the entire Afghan–Uzbek border, and part of the
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan border before turning north-
west through eastern Turkmenistan, into the Uzbek
autonomous republic of Karakalpakistan, and expiring in
the desert near where it once fed the Aral Sea from the
south. Worthy of note here is the lengthy Kara Kum canal,
a man made irrigation ditch ﬂowing northwest through
most of Turkmenistan. This canal was conceived during the
early Soviet period as part of a regional irrigation scheme
referred to by Grigoryev (1952) as “the Stalin plan for
remodeling nature” (p. 170).
Regional analysis of the Aral Sea is fraught with
a number of issues. The most natural regionwould perhaps
be the Aral Sea drainage basin, including the Aral itself
and the drainage basins of its feeder river systems, the
Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Today this natural region is
politically fragmented, including portions outside of Central
Asia (China, Afghanistan, and Iran) as well as Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and southern
Kazakhstan. The resulting discontinuity between the
superimposed political boundaries (human artifacts) and
the Aral Sea basin (natural environmental region) forms
a fundamental foundation for any analysis of contemporary
nature–society linkswithin the region.What remains of the
Aral Sea is today shared by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The
immediate region, including the deltas of the Syr Darya and
Amu Darya, is located within Kazakhstan’s Kyzlorda oblast,
Turkmenistan’s Dashaguz oblast, and the Karakalpakistan
autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. These three sub
national geographical units, closest to the Aral itself, have
suffered the brunt of the ecological and socio-economic
consequences of the sea’s retreat (Feshbach & Friendly,
1992; Micklin, 2006). As a result, this paper’s focus will
primarily be on this localized region, the contemporary
interactions between its inhabitants and the natural envi-
ronment surrounding the Aral Sea itself. Some ﬂuidity in
regional treatment is necessary, however, particularly in
examining historical developments in the wider region of
Central Asia, as well as the modern disputes and coopera-
tion between states in the Aral Sea drainage basin.
3. Historical nexuses
3.1. Early period
Human beings and the Aral Sea region’s natural envi-
ronment have operated in an interrelated system for
millennia. The region’s physical landscape is singularly
marked by its aridity, dominated by two large deserts (the
Fig. 1. Central Asia and the Aral Sea region.
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and vast expanses of arid and semi-arid steppe (throughout
much of Kazakhstan). In such an environment, sources of
fresh water become of paramount importance to the
survival of each of the region’s species, including humans.
At around 5000 B.C. irrigation within the region began in
the northern foothills of the Kopet Dag Mountains in what
is today southwestern Turkmenistan (Lewis, 1966). This
seminal human adaptation and modiﬁcation allowed the
formation of agricultural production, longer-term human
settlements, and ultimately large cities (particularly, in this
early period, Urgench and Merv in today’s Turkmenistan).
Irrigation began to diffuse throughout the region, and by
roughly 500 B.C. a spatial dichotomization of the pop-
ulation had appeared. By this time, the Syr Darya River had
become a natural boundary between nomadic peoples
(Sythians) to the north and sedentary agriculturalists
(Sogdians, Bactrians, Khwarazmians) to the south (Lewis,
1966). Nomadic pastoralism within the vast steppe of
Central Asia necessitated a cognizance of natural ecosys-
tems and movements in tune with seasonal changes. The
formation of sedentary agricultural settlements was pre-
conditioned by the presence of rivers and the development
of animal husbandry and irrigation systems. By the fourth
century A.D. the area witnessed a decline of irrigation
region-wide (Lewis, 1966). This drop off was largely the
result of the invasion of the nomadic Huns and concomi-
tant destruction of settlements and irrigation facilities
(O’Hara & Hannan, 1999). This ﬁrst undulating wave of
development, ascendancy, and decline in irrigation, lasting
over 5000 years, serves as a foreshadowing precursor.
Fluctuations in the region’s irrigation intensity (though
much shorter in amplitude and frequency over time) would
continue into the 21st century.
3.2. Mongol invasion and aftermath
The second major nomadic invasion of the region, that
of the Mongols, began in the early 13th century. In 1219 theMongols entered what is today Kazakhstan and in two
years time had conquered the region and its major cities of
Bukhara, Samarkand, Khodjent, Urgench, and Merv
(Grousset, 2002). The Mongols recognized that pop-
ulations, agricultural systems, and entire economic bases
owed their existence to a single source of water (typically
the Syr Darya, the Amu Darya, or their tributaries).
Destruction of a single dam, for instance, resulted in the
quick destruction of Merv (O’Hara & Hannan, 1999). In
similar fashion, Urgench was ﬂooded by waters of the Amu
Darya (Grousset, 2002). TheMongol military success can be
attributed to a number of factors (adept command of
Genghis Khan, element of speed and surprise, previously
unencountered military tactics) though one that must be
mentioned was the reliance (and vulnerability) of the
sedentary populous on water. This vulnerability was
exploited by the Mongols and certainly expedited their
conquest of the region.
Human–natural environment linkages beyond military
techniques also diffused into Central Asiawith the arrival of
the Mongols. An appropriate ﬁrst consideration would be
the natural environmental elements that formed the very
core of this people’s social identity. The Mongols, through
endogenously perpetrated legend, believed themselves to
be descendant from two steppe fauna species, a wolf and
a female deer (Morgan, 1990). These ﬁrst Mongol inhabi-
tants also brought with them animist tendencies,
worshiping the Eternal Blue Sky and the Golden Light of the
Sun. Genghis Khan himself sought spiritual guidance atop
Mongolia’s Burkhan Khuldun (God Mountain) given this
locale’s proximity to the Great Blue Sky (Weatherford,
2004). Interestingly today, these two environmental
elements (the blue sky and the sun and its rays) remain
important in the national and political symbology of
Kazakhstan, featuring prominently on the state’s national
ﬂag. Genghis Khan also decreed an end to all hunting
during the breeding seasons between March and October,
and additionally outlawed unnecessary killing (in an early
form of bag limits) beyond what was absolutely needed
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and wildlife management programs, this represented an
early effort aimed at ensuring the sustainability of wildlife
(game) resources.
The Mongols have been referred to as “sons of the
grassland” (Smith, 1943, p. 156), and a “spontaneous crea-
tion of the soil itself” (Grousset, 2002, p. xi). Lattimore
(1938) offers a welcome advance of the deterministic
view of the interrelationship between Mongol steppe
nomads and the physical environment in which they
conquered, lived, and ruled. These nomads lived in balance
with the physical environment. In reality, the steppe has
a variety of localized, natural conditions. A range of possi-
bilities afforded by ‘nature’ offered the Mongols a range of
societal choices with respect to livelihood (Lattimore,
1938). As with all cultures and societies, the natural envi-
ronment provided constraints (limited possibilities), and
the Mongols, like others before and after, adapted. These
societal adaptations included domestication of the horse
(Smith, 1943), mobile and ﬂexible pastoral nomadism
techniques (Fletcher, 1986), and hunting and corralling
game on horseback with bow and arrow (Weatherford,
2004). These particular adaptations were also to serve the
Mongol invaders well in Central Asia (and elsewhere) in an
easy transference to military use.
3.3. Russian Tsarist period and colonization
The Russian empire’s conquest of and expansion into
Central Asia began in the 1730s with the gradual diffusion
into Kazakhstan and continued to the 1895 annexation of
the Pamir Mountain region of Tajikistan; a 165-year period
that brought all of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (including the
khanates of Khiva and Bukhara), Turkmenistan, and
Tajikistan under Russian control, cementing the southern-
most boundary of the Russian Empire (Soucek, 2007). In
true colonial fashion, Tsarist Russia’s vast Central Asian
possessions, were viewed as a source of raw materials and
potential market for Russian goods. During the latter half of
the 19th century, continued expansion of the Russian
Empire ever closer to British India made Central Asia the
focus of the famed ‘Great Game’ geopolitical struggle
between two of the world’s colonial powers (see e.g.
Hopkirk, 1994).
For the Aral Sea and its regional inhabitants, the Tsarist
period was of utmost signiﬁcance. In 1848, Russian Naval
ofﬁcer Alexey Butakoff led an expedition that conducted
the ﬁrst full navigation and survey of the Aral Sea. The
resulting map (now known simply as ‘the Butakoff map’) of
great detail and high quality retains its unique scholarly
value today. In addition to observations of the Aral itself
and the local pastoral inhabitants, Butakoff (1853) also
details a number of tiger sightings. The now-extinct Turan
(also known as Caspian or Persian) tiger (Panthera tigris
virgata) roamed the Caspian region and the riparian habitat
along the major rivers of Central Asia, particularly the Syr
Darya and Amu Darya (Prynn, 2003). At the time of
Butakoff’s exploration, these tigers were numerous. Within
the next century, the Turan tiger would disappear from the
region, due largely to Russian (and later Soviet) active
hunting, in addition to increasing human settlement,fragmentation of tiger habitat, and overall decline of the
ecological situation throughout the Aral Sea drainage basin
(Prynn, 2003).
The Russian Empire’s expansion into Central Asia
brought with it a decision that would ultimately transform
the region’s ecosystems and its human economic, social,
and political landscapes: the decision to increase the
production of cotton within the newly acquired region. By
the mid 19th century Russia was dependent upon imports
of cotton, largely from the United States (Joffe, 1995). The
US Civil War (1861–5) signiﬁcantly disrupted the American
supply of cotton, forcing Tsarist Russia to look elsewhere for
this much needed raw material. The Central Asian territo-
ries offered great potential in this regard, given the region’s
long growing season and seemingly ample supply of water
from the great Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers. For
successful large-scale cotton harvests, however, the
Russians realized the need for a dramatic increase in irri-
gated acreage and a higher quality grade of cotton (Matley,
1970). In 1870 US cotton (the American Upland variety) was
introduced into the region, and irrigated cultivation and
production increased dramatically from this time until the
Russian revolutions of 1917 (Whitman, 1956). Construction
of railroad lines in the 1880s linking Central Asia to Russia
expedited cotton exports and brought an inﬂux of Russian
agricultural settlers, many of whom quickly seized themost
fertile lands (Soucek, 2007). Native populations were also
adversely affected by the shift to cotton cultivation, which
came at the expense of food crops and fodder for pastoral
livestock. As a result, the traditional nomadic existence
suffered from the necessity to import food and feed crops,
forcing many to settle (Whitman, 1956).
The Russian Empire decision to concentrate cotton
production in Central Asia may have initially been consid-
ered a success. By the outbreak of the First World War
(1914) the region was a major supplier of cotton, allowing
Russia to become among the world leaders in cotton
production (Whitman, 1956). Even at this early date,
however, Russian ofﬁcials were confronted with a number
of difﬁculties associated with such large-scale irrigation in
an arid environment. Not only was such a scheme costly in
economic terms, the diversion of river water raised the
undergroundwater table, creating water logging and an
increased salinization of soils. Swampland increased
throughout the region, resulting in widespread malarial
outbreaks (Matley, 1970). In the ﬁnal years of the Russian
empire, these societal and environmental costs were
overshadowed by war and revolution, though offered
warnings ultimately unheeded by the successor Soviet
state.
3.4. The Soviet period
During the ﬁrst decade of its existence, the nascent
Soviet state’s Central Asian populous remained linked to its
natural environment as nomadic herders in the steppe
regions and sedentary agriculturalists in oases along the
Syr Darya and Amu Darya. Tsarist irrigation and cotton
production had tailed off in the immediate aftermath of
war and revolution. By 1924 boundary delimitation along
ethno-linguistic divisions formed the foundation of what,
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Socialist Republics in the region. The Aral Sea and its feeder
rivers were ﬁrmly situated within the Soviet Union, with
only minute portions of the drainage basin extended into
Afghanistan and China. The level of the Aral Sea itself was
ﬁrst systematically monitored in 1911, and over the
following ﬁve decades its level remained fairly stable
(Micklin, 2006). During this period the Aral supported
a substantial ﬁshing industry, based on the harvest of at
least twenty commercially viable ﬁsh species (Glantz,
1999). The northern Aral ﬁshing port of Aralsk,
Kazakhstan was the scene of a major ﬁsh harvest and
shipment by rail (14 wagon loads of ﬁsh) toward off famine
in Russia. A 1921 letter of request from Lenin to the people
of Aralsk features prominently in the town’s central square
today, as does a mural depicting the event in the town’s
train station.
In 1929, under Stalin, an effort to collectivize agricul-
tural land, pasture, livestock, and in fact all natural
resources, began (Soucek, 2007). This momentous rupture
of the human–environment balance had particularly
disastrous consequences in Kazakhstan. In protest of
conﬁscation of herds and pasture lands, Kazakh nomads
responded by slaughtering livestock. Between 1928 and
1934, livestock losses in the republic amounted to over 70
percent of cattle, nearly 90 percent of sheep, and over 80
percent of horses (Holdsworth, 1952). Resulting retaliatory
massacre, widespread famine, and forced out migration
saw a precipitous drop of at least 1.2 million in the native
Kazakh population (Shayakhmetov, 2007).
The 1930s also bore witness to the disappearance of the
Turan tiger from the Aral Sea region and drainage basin.
A large inﬂux of non-native human populations into the
fertile agricultural oases effectively fragmented the tiger’s
habitat, dispersing the species and resulting in sharp
declines in numbers. Active hunting also decimated specie
numbers, as the eventual Soviet ban on tiger hunting in
1947 proved too late to save the now-extinct tiger. The last
remaining tigers in the region, populating what was left of
the thick reed beds along the Syr Darya, Amu Darya and
around Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash, were killed off during
this decade (Prynn, 2003).
Following the Second World War, Soviet planners
sought to revitalize the earlier Tsarist era scheme of making
Central Asia into a major source of raw cotton. A drive
began to dramatically increase cotton cultivation and
harvests within this arid region (Holdsworth, 1952). The
plan’s ultimate success required vast expansion of irriga-
tion infrastructure, as well as sizeable application of
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and later defoliants. The
expansion and maintenance of the region’s cotton mono-
culture (the crop is referred to locally as ‘white gold’)
would, of course, prove disastrous for the region’s natural
ecosystems and human populations within the following
four decades.
The year 1960 represents an important benchmark in
the Aral Sea’s history. As previously noted, this year marked
the end of recent stability in the lake’s level. Nearly all
accounts of the late-20th century shrinking of the Aral
reference its ‘starting’ level in 1960. During the 1950s and
1960s, Soviet plans to expand cotton production in CentralAsia required a concomitant increase in irrigation. These
planners, in a rudimentary cost-beneﬁt analysis, simply
weighed the economic gains of irrigated agriculture against
the economic value (presumably the ﬁshing industry) of
the Aral Sea. The decline of the Aral was expected and
deemed a positive economic outcome (Micklin, 1988).
The Soviet push to increase cotton production
continuedwithin the Aral Sea basin from 1960 to the state’s
collapse just over three decades later. Between 1960 and
1988, area under cotton cultivation rose from 1.9 million
hectares to 3.1 million hectares (Pomfret, 2002). Such
increases in sown area required more irrigation, more
water diverted from the rivers, and ultimately less inﬂow
into the Aral Sea. Irrigation canals were overwhelmingly
unlined, resulting in massive seepages into the ground-
water, effectively raising groundwater levels and increasing
salinization. Also increased was the application of fertil-
izers, herbicides, pesticides, and defoliants. The resulting
cotton harvest results were viewed an economic success by
Soviet planners, as the USSR became the world’s second-
largest cotton exporter by the 1980s (Feshbach & Friendly,
1992). Between 1960 and 1988 Soviet raw cotton produc-
tion increased from just less than 4.3 million tons to 8.7
million tons (Pomfret, 2002).
This more than doubling of output spelled disaster for
the Aral Sea and its region’s inhabitants. Between 1960 and
1989, the Aral’s area shrank by 41 percent, its volume
dropped by 67 percent, and the salinity of its water tripled
(Micklin, 2006). The Aral’s once-thriving ﬁshing industry
was decimated, forcing the closure of processing facilities
in Aralsk, Kazakhstan and Moynaq, Uzbekistan. For the
region’s human populous, bleak employment prospects
were compounded by the negative health effects associated
with the concentrations of salts and toxic chemicals in the
land, water, and food supply. In Karakalpakistan, infant
mortality rates were double the USSR average, and even
higher within Turkmenistan’s Dashaguz oblast (Feshbach &
Friendly, 1992).
3.5. Independence
With the dissolution of the USSR, the socioeconomic
and ecological crisis in the Aral Sea region became inheri-
ted by the newly independent states of Central Asia. During
the ﬁrst decades of independence, ecological concerns in
the region took a back seat to market-oriented economic
restructuring, economic development, and the building
and maintenance of political state identity. What remained
of the Aral Sea itself was situated in the borderlands
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The drainage basins
of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers were additionally
shared by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. With
water diversion plans and cotton quotas no longer
emanating from Moscow, each new state was free to use
riparian resources within its own borders as it saw ﬁt.
Disputes and conﬂicting interests could no longer be
mediated byMoscow and now fell into the realm of foreign
policy and international relations between independ-
ent states. Competing interests would therefore translate
into potential conﬂict between upstream states (Kyrgy-
zstan and Tajikistan) desirous of tapping hydroelectric
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Turkmenistan) reliant upon irrigation.
Realizing the need for cooperation with respect to
management of water along the Syr Darya and Amu Darya,
the newly independent states of Central Asia met within
one month of the Soviet collapse, agreeing to form a supra-
national body tomanagewater use. The resulting Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), ratiﬁed in
1993, sought to foster such cooperation in management of
the region’s water resources (Dukhovny, 2007). While
deemed a success in alleviating outright conﬂict during its
ﬁrst decade of existence, the commission had its share of
disputes, particularly between an upstream state
(Kyrgyzstan) and two downstream states (Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan) on the Syr Darya, as well as between two
downstream states (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) along
the Amu Darya. In the former case, at issue were the
perceived irregularities in water releases by Kyrgyzstan at
its immense Toktogul Reservoir on the Naryn River; in the
latter, at issue was a dispute on the amount of water
diverted from the Amu Darya by the Kara Kum Canal in
Turkmenistan (Micklin, 2002).
The fall of the Soviet Union also ushered an inﬂux of
international support and extra-regional initiatives con-
cerned with the Aral Sea region’s plight. In the early 1990s,
the World Bank, for instance, embarked on the Aral Sea
Basin Program (ASBP) with explicit goals of stabilizing the
region’s natural environment, improving the immediate
disaster area around the Aral Sea, strengthening interstate
water management, and fostering regional capacity in the
program’s implementation (Uitto & Duda, 2002).
4. Contemporary nature–society links in the Aral Sea
region
Across the immediate Aral Sea region today, the lake’s
desiccating retreat continues (Fig. 2). Recent popular press
accounts of the Aral’s ‘return’ (see, e.g. Conant, 2006; Finn,
2007; Fletcher, 2007) seem overly optimistic when viewed
at this larger regional scale. The smaller Little Aral in the
north, located wholly within Kazakhstan, has been stabi-
lized with the help of World Bank intervention. As part of
what is termed the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea
Phase 1 Project (World Bank, 2010), an 8-mile (13 km)
earthen dyke was completed in 2005. This dyke, the 200 m
Kok Aral Dam, and signiﬁcant re-channeling of the Syr
Darya (including the Ak-lak spillway) have resulted in
greater inﬂow into the Little Aral. The scale of the nearly
$86 million project is enormous. A visit to this particular
area in 2006, with its multiple concrete partitions, platoon
of bulldozers and earth moving equipment, conjured
images of Grigoryev (1952) and the Soviet-era Stalinist plan
to ‘remodel nature,’ though this time aimed at environ-
mental restoration. The artiﬁcial capture and re-channeling
of the Syr Darya, and the resulting expansion of the Little
Aral has, for this small part of the Aral Sea, enabled the
return of ﬁshing as well as this small lake’s climatic
moderation function (see, e.g. Finn, 2007). Total ﬁsh
biomass (in the northern, Little Aral) has risen rapidly since
the project’s completion, expanding from 3500 tons in
2005 to 18,000 tons in 2011 (Pala, 2011). The return ofﬁshing has brought hope and optimism to the Little Aral’s
small, remote, sand-swept villages. Relative improvements
in one small corner of the Aral Sea aside, the wider region
today, particularly surrounding the larger, southern Aral,
remains in ecological and socioeconomic crisis. This crisis,
very much anthropogenic in origin, today continues to
permeate the interrelationships between the region’s
human populous and the natural environment. Nature–
society links within the region today coalesce along
economic, human health, and political dimensions.
4.1. Regional economy
As former Soviet republics, each of the newly inde-
pendent states within the region in essence began
statehood with very similar initial economic conditions,
though with dissimilar natural resource endowments. In
the nearly two decades since, these ﬁve states have
embarked on markedly different paths of privatization,
economic liberalization, and market orientation, which in
part have resulted in sharp intra-regional divergences in
terms of economic output and growth (Pomfret, 2006), as
well as socio-economic development (White, 2009).
Currently fairly wide disparities exist within Central Asia
with respect to output, economic development, economic
freedom, and (perhaps less so) perceived corruption
(Table 1). Perhaps most striking are the regional dispar-
ities with respect to economic output as expressed in per
capita, purchasing power parity terms (ﬁrst column, Table
1). Kazakhstan, the regional heavyweight in this regard,
has a per capita GDP well over double the regions second
ranked state (Turkmenistan), and more than six times
that of the lowest (Tajikistan). The world’s 9th largest
state in territory, Kazakhstan is incredibly well endowed
with natural resources including uranium, copper, gold,
natural gas, and in particular with respect to its economic
output, petroleum. Kazakhstan also witnessed high,
double digit economic growth rates during the 2005–08
period, largely the result of record high global oil prices
and additions/improvements to export infrastructure.
Tajikistan, small, mountainous, and not well resource-
endowed (with the lone exception of water) was engul-
fed in a civil war for much of the 1990s and remains
mired in poverty. Contentious neighbors Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan both with per capita GDPs below $2500, have
their own economic challenges. Kyrgyzstan, small and
only slightly less mountainous than Tajikistan, has simi-
larly bleak natural resource endowments as its poverty-
stricken southern neighbor, though does have sizeable
gold deposits that have attracted signiﬁcant foreign
investment. Kyrgyzstan is also the only state of the region
having been admitted to the World Trade Organization,
a product of its vigorous pursuit of early economic
reforms, though has been afﬂicted with political insta-
bility and multiple revolutions during the past decade.
Populous Uzbekistan is one of the world’s leading
producers and exporters of raw unprocessed cotton, and
has natural gas deposits, as well as gold and other
minerals. Turkmenistan, largely desert and watered
nearly entirely by the Kara Kum canal, has an economy
dominated by its signiﬁcant natural gas reserves and
Fig. 2. 21st century desiccation of the Aral Sea: 2000 and 2011. Both are Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) images captured aboard
NASA’s Terra satellite. The image on the left was captured on August 19, 2000, while the image on the right was captured on August 15, 2011. Both show the
approximate extent, outlined in black, of the Aral Sea in 1960. Source: NASA Earth Observatory, 2011.
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producer and exporter of cotton.
In a similar vein to intra-regional per capita output
rankings, divergences also exist with respect to economic
development (second column, Table 1). The UN’s popular
Human Development Index (HDI) ranks states based on
indexed values based on per capita GDP, life expectancy,
adult literacy, and school enrollment ratio, effectively
broadening its focus to also include human health- and
education-related variables. Over the past decade, each of
the region’s states has decreased its ranking vis-a-vis the
rest of the world (column 3, Table 1), although Kazakhstan
has droppedmuch less dramatically. It should be noted that
the 1999 HDI (using 1997 data) ranked eight fewer (174
versus 182) states than did the 2009 edition, and each of
the Central Asian states has been unable to maintain
Soviet-era levels of investment in health care and educa-
tion, especially so in the region’s poorest states.
Central Asia has been referred to as one of the world’s
most corrupt regions (Åslund, 2003), and empirical dataTable 1
Selected economic indicators, Central Asia.
pcGDPa HDIr07b HDIrDc CPIrd EFre
Kazakhstan 10,863 82 6 120 82
Kyrgyzstan 2006 120 23 164 80
Tajikistan 1753 127 19 152 128
Turkmenistan 4953 109 13 177 171
Uzbekistan 2425 119 27 177 158
a Gross domestic product per capita ($US, purchasing power parity)
2007. Source: UNDP, 2009.
b Human Development Index rank 2007 (of 182 states ranked). Source:
UNDP, 2009.
c Change in Human Development Index rank, 1997–2007. Source:
UNDP, 2009, 1999.
d Corruption Perceptions Index rank 2011 (of 183 states ranked).
Source: Transparency International, 2011.
e Index of Economic Freedom rank 2010 (of 179 states ranked). Source:
Heritage Foundation, 2010.from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) seem to bear this out (column 4, Table 1). With
the lone exception of Kazakhstan, each of the regions’
states falls within the world’s bottom seventh in perceived
corruption rankings. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (the
latter is tied with ﬁve other states one rank above the
former) are ranked just above the world’s most corrupt
states of Chad, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and
Somalia. This issue of corruption has particular resonance
in the Aral Sea region, given its historical legacy (the Uzbek
‘cotton affair’ brought to light during the 1980s involved an
intricate network of patronage and deceit, bilking the USSR
of millions of rubles) and present concerns involving allo-
cations of international funding assistance.
An additional illuminating way of examining the
constituent economies of Central Asia is through
a comparison of the multifaceted concept of economic
freedom. The Heritage Foundation’s most recent (2010)
index of economic freedom (column 5, Table 1) ranks 179
world economies based on ten separate categories
(including, among others, freedom from corruption, labor
freedom, ﬁnancial freedom, business freedom, and prop-
erty rights). The region’s most free economies, Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan, are classiﬁed in this index as ‘moderately
free,’while Tajikistan is categorized as ‘mostly unfree.’ Both
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan fall within the ‘repressed’
category, two of only 36 economies so categorized. The
general lack of economic freedom, that is to say, the
inability of individuals to make their own economic deci-
sions, becomes important in the subsequent discussion of
cotton, in particular with respect to Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, the region’s largest cotton producers. Indi-
vidual property rights are extremely weak in Uzbekistan
(Spechler, Bektemirov, Chepel, & Suvankulov, 2004), and
almost completely nonexistent in Turkmenistan (Repkine,
2004). Furthermore, each of these states retains aspects
of the Soviet central planning model, where output is
directed by the central state authorities. In Uzbekistan, the
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tural sectors (Pomfret, 2006), while in Turkmenistan nearly
every economic sector remains under central government
(i.e. presidential) control.
Each of the national economies within Central Asia are
strongly oriented to the primary sector (extractive indus-
tries and agriculture), arguably that subset of economic
activity most closely tied to the natural, physical environ-
ment (nature). In addition, economic activity (and in fact
human survival) heavily depends on the region’s water
resources. Irrigated agriculture, for instance, forms a size-
able proportion of state gross domestic product within
Central Asia, accounting for 39 percent of all economic
output in Kyrgyzstan, 35 percent in Uzbekistan, 25 percent
in Turkmenistan, 23 percent in Tajikistan, and eight percent
in Kazakhstan (Weinthal, 2006). With respect to the
immediate Aral Sea region, irrigated agriculture’s contri-
bution to economic output is even greater, particularly in
Kazakhstan. A number of agricultural crops are grown
within the Aral region, including wheat, rice, various fruits
and other foodstuffs, though the dominant (in terms of
overall impact on the region – both societal and natural
environmental) crop in the region is most certainly cotton,
having attained monoculture status during the Soviet
period, and referred to in many contexts as ‘white gold.’
As previously discussed, Soviet Central Asia, watered by
the Amu Dary and Syr Darya rivers, became the primary
source of cotton of the USSR. The economic beneﬁts (at
least in the relative short term) became clear as the Soviet
state became among the world leaders in cotton produc-
tion. In general, such production needed, particularly as
sown and harvested in the Soviet Union, a number of inputs
(in addition of course to land and labor) including water,
fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, and defoliants. As the
central push for increased production of cotton emanated
fromMoscow, an increase in irrigated land and the increase
of application of the various inputs resulted, culminating in
what, by the late 20th century, an unsustainable endeavor.
The natural environmental devastation associated with the
desiccating Aral Sea region, and the associated socio-
economic negative externalities show that natural envi-
ronmental costs of cotton production in this arid region
were not viewed as important in the Soviet cost-beneﬁt
analysis of large scale cotton production.
Today, the region remains a leader in global cotton
production and exports. Based on the most recent data
(USDA, 2011), Uzbekistan ranks 7th in the world in terms of
cotton production, and 5th in terms of cotton exports.
Turkmenistan is the next important cotton state in the
region, ranking 8th in the world in production and 6th in
terms of exports. Tajikistan (17th globally in production,
11th in exports) and Kazakhstan (22nd in production, 15th
in exports) are also important in the world cotton market,
while Kyrgyzstan is not currently amajor global presence in
this regard, ranking 38th in production and 30th in exports.
As a result, the cotton industry represents a vital source of
export revenue, particularly for Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. As structured in Central Asia, the industry is
also highly labor intensive and provides a source of much
needed employment in rural areas where other such
opportunities are scarce. Despite these beneﬁts of thecotton industry to the states of the Aral Sea region, many
now view the various costs of cotton production (again as
currently practiced in the region) as far exceeding the
beneﬁts (ICG, 2005; Spoor, 1993). The negative impacts of
Central Asia’s cotton industry on the region’s natural
environment are perhaps most dramatic, at the extreme
manifested in the shrinking of the Aral Sea itself, as well as
the destruction of the ecosystems associated with the sea
and the riparian deltaic habitats. Though a scarce resource,
water is largely free, resulting in no incentives to conserve
this precious resource and no incentives to improve the
efﬁciency of irrigation infrastructure (Spoor, 1993).
Economic concerns emanate as well, given the primacy
of a primary commodity with wide historical price ﬂuctu-
ations. Within the region’s three major cotton exporters
(Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), state procure-
ment prices are set artiﬁcially low (much lower than the
global market price), and in turn this cotton is exported at
the higher world market price (ICG, 2005). As the state sets
raw cotton prices, mandates production targets, subsidizes
domestic production by providing ‘free’ water (Weinthal,
2006), and in fact dictates what farmers can grow
(primarily cotton in the Aral region), farmers remain
entrenched within a cycle of poverty. Labor intensive har-
vesting is also wrought with drawbacks as low wages and
what amounts to forced labor prevail during the fall cotton
harvests. Particularly in Uzbekistan, the use of school
children in the cotton ﬁelds (a holdover practice from the
Soviet period) continues today. It is estimated that up to
half of the cotton produced in Uzbekistan is harvested by
the 450,000 children annually sent to the cotton ﬁelds,
leading many to urge an international boycott of Uzbek
cotton (Saidazimova, 2007).
4.2. Human health
International medical health professionals working in
the Aral Sea region have stated that here, “the level of
health and the quality of life is profoundly poor and dete-
riorating further” (Small, van der Meer, & Upshur, 2001, p.
549). An examination of the region’s human health condi-
tions should begin with a recognition of the ties between
human health and the health of a given ecosystem, of
which, of course, humans are one constituent specie. In
general, the poor overall health conditions among the Aral
region’s populations can be viewed as a direct result of the
Aral Sea crisis’ ecological devastation, an indirect result of
unemployment and poverty associated with economic
collapse, and additionally as a result of the collapse of the
Soviet health care system and the inability of the newly
independent states in the region to maintain this system
and its coverage.
More speciﬁc causes of human health problems in the
Aral Sea region revolve around the increased salinity and
mineralization of water supplies, as well as the continued
use and presence of agricultural chemicals. Inefﬁcient
irrigation practices, which continue today, have resulted in
the raising of water tables, water saturating formerly
productive agricultural land, and increasing the salt
and mineral content of the region’s water. In addition, the
heavy application of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and
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persisting in the ecosystem and food chain, washing
downstream and concentrating in the immediate Aral Sea
region.
Soviet application of these agricultural chemicals was
heavy and intense. Between 1980 and 1992, pesticides
(primarily dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, or DDT and
lindane) were applied to cotton ﬁelds at a rate of 54 kilo-
grams per hectare in Uzbekistan and 72 kilograms per
hectare in Karakalpakistan. During the same period, the
rate of such application in Russia was 4 kilograms per
hectare and in the United States 1.6 kilograms per hectare
(Ataniyazova, 2003). Further upstream along the Amu
Darya in Tajikistan, Soviet journalists observed in 1983
aerial application of defoliant on cotton ﬁelds while school
children were picking cotton (Feshbach & Friendly, 1992).
Perhaps most alarming is the heightened and widespread
presence in the Aral Sea region today of what has been
called “the most toxic dioxin” (Ataniyazova, Baumann,
et al., 2001, p. 806), the substance 2,3,7,8-Tetra-
chlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin (TCDD). TCDD is classiﬁed as
a known human carcinogen and gained notoriety as an
active element of the defoliant Agent Orange used during
the Vietnam War (US Department of Health and Human
Services, 2005). Concentrations of TCDD within the Aral
Sea region today represent some of the highest docu-
mented to date in the world (Ataniyazova, Adrian, et al.,
2001). Very high concentrations of TCDD have even been
detected in mother’s milk within human populations in the
Kyzlorda oblast of Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan’s Kar-
akalpakistan republic (Ataniyazova, Baumann, et al., 2001).
Human populations within the Aral Sea region face an
onslaught of exposure to these salts, heavy metals, and
chemical toxins through the air they breathe, the water
they drink, and the food they ingest.Within Turkmenistan’s
Dashaguz oblast, for instance, airborne dust is deposited at
a rate among theworld’s highest, and it has been found that
this dust is heavily laden with pesticides (O’Hara, Wiggs,
Mamedov, Davidson, & Hubbard, 2000). In Karakalpaki-
stan, respiratory diseases are rampant and increasing
(Wiggs et al., 2003). Access to safe drinking water is an
additional problem. Within Karakalpakistan, 70 percent of
tested drinking water fell short of acceptable chemical
standards, and approximately 30 percent had excessive
biological content, in particular sewage contamination
(Small, Falzon, van der Meer, & Ford, 2003). Compounding
human exposure is a contaminated food supply, particu-
larly (though not entirely) foods of animal origin such as
meat, milk, and eggs. As a result, dietary dioxin intake for
a typical Karakalpakistan inhabitant is nearly three times
higher than what the World Health Organization deems
safe (Muntean et al., 2003).
Particular attention has been focused on the increase in
diseases among the Aral Sea region’s children, a vulnerable
demographic cohort forming the region’s future stock of
human capital. Much of this increase has been directly
linked to the region’s declining ecological health (Kaneko
et al., 2002). Infant mortality rates in the region today are
high, exceeding 100 infant deaths per 1000 live births in
many locations (Wiggs et al., 2003). This ﬁgure places the
Aral region among the world’s highest rates of infantmortality, exceeded by only a few states in sub-Saharan
Africa. The litany of health problems faced by the region’s
children is striking. In addition to the concentrations of
TCDD in human breast milk mentioned above, infants have
also been observed refusing their own mother’s milk
because of its elevated salt content (Franz & Fitzroy, 2006).
In addition, concentrations of the heavy metals cadmium
and lead have been shown to severely impair kidney
function in the region’s children (Kaneko et al., 2003), and
elevated levels of the chemical compounds DDT and poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) have been found in their
blood (Ataniyazova, Baumann, et al., 2001). Diseases on the
increase in children include urolithiasis (kidney stones),
chronic bronchitis, immune deﬁciency, atrophic gastritis,
and anemia (Kaneko et al., 2002).
As with its children, the adult populations within the
Aral Sea region are additionally plagued by poor health.
Infectious respiratory diseases are a particular problem.
This region exhibits the highest rates of tuberculosis (TB)
within the entire former Soviet territory (Wiggs et al.,
2003). While a TB outbreak is classiﬁed as an epidemic
when more than 50 per 100,000 people are newly infected,
within the Aral region rates of up to 265 per 100,000 have
been documented (Small & Bunce, 2003). Heightened rates
of multidrug-resistant TB have also been found (Cox et al.,
2004). The region’s populace additionally suffer in exceed-
ingly high rates from anemia, both within the general
population (Small & Bunce, 2003), and particularly among
pregnant women (Ataniyazova, Baumann, et al., 2001).
Further elevated disease incidences, including heart
disease, kidney disease, hepatitis, hypertension, cancers,
typhoid, dysentery, and diarrheal diseases, have also been
identiﬁed (Micklin, 2007; Small et al., 2001, 2003).
Adding to the already overwhelming barrage of negative
health consequences are the potential catastrophic dangers
posed by what was once an island in the Aral Sea. Voz-
rozhdeniye (resurrection or rebirth) Island, once straddling
the maritime border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
in the heart of the Aral, was the primary testing ground for
the Soviet biological weapons program. First used for this
purpose during the 1930s, the island at that time was
a logical location for testing, a result of its geographical
isolation surrounded by sparsely populated deserts, a hot
dry climate, sparse vegetation, and searing summer sands
all reducing the threat of diffusion of biological agents.
As an island deepwithin the Aral Sea, the threat of diffusion
by insects or other animals was alsominimized (Bozheyeva,
Kunakbayev, & Yeleukenov, 1999). Through its years of
operation up to the Soviet collapse, the Vozrozhdeniye
facilities tested the delivery and efﬁcacy of such weapons
grade biological agents as anthrax, smallpox, Venezuelan
equine encephalitis, plague, and brucellosis (Cook &Woolf,
2002). Though the testing here ceased with the exodus of
the Soviets in 1992, the resilience of these biological agents
and their potential spread represents an additional health
concern within the region. As the Aral Sea has receded, the
former island is now part of a large peninsula extending
from the south. Regional fauna freely move in and out of
the area, and could spread any remaining biological
organisms into neighboring human populations (Micklin &
Aladin, 2008).
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The larger Aral Sea crisis and management of the water
resources of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya continue to have
political ramiﬁcations within the region. With the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, the Sea itself and management
issues surrounding its feeder rivers shifted from a domestic
issue controlled by Moscow to an international issue
involving the region’s ﬁve newly independent states. Today,
salient links between the region’s natural environment and
human populations coalesce around the political issues of
international conﬂict, interstate cooperation, and the
emergence of ethnic nationalism within certain local
populations.
Given the importance of water to the regional economy,
the overall aridity of the region, and the trans-boundary
nature of the major water sources, the existence of
conﬂicts over water here is not surprising. Indeed, such
disputes are most apt to occur in arid regions where (and
when) the supply of water is insufﬁcient to meet regional
demand (Haftendorn, 2000). Within Central Asia these
conditions, particularly in times of drought, form the basis
of regional tensions (Spoor, 1998). Some have posited the
likelihood of ‘water wars’ erupting between (or within)
states over allocation of scarce water resources (see e.g.
Starr, 1991 or Amery, 2002). Such a scenario is a genuine
concern within Central Asia, in particular as the Aral Sea
has been identiﬁed as one of four basins (Jordan, Nile,
Tigris-Euphrates being the other) where the potential for
ongoing disputes places it in the highest at-risk category
(Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003).
Central Asia’s physical geography and relatively recently
imposed international political borders conspire to make
tensions over water allocation almost inevitable. The
region’s water supply is generated in the mountainous
upland areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (upstream states),
eventually ﬂowing through the steppe and desert areas
of southern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan
(downstream states). A spatial discontinuity betweenwater
supply andwater use persistswithin the region, as upstream
states generate approximately 80 percent of Central Asia’s
water, though use only 16 percent. Conversely, the region’s
downstream states supply roughly 12 percent of the region’s
water while using 82 percent (Micklin, 2002). While
conﬂicts have materialized between nearly all the region’s
riparian pairs, two conﬂict case examples elucidate the
particular dynamics inherent in water disputes within the
region.
The ﬁrst conﬂict instance involves the ongoing dispute
between the upstream state of Tajikistan and downstream
Uzbekistan over the Roghun Dam project, intermittently
under construction since the Soviet period and a particular
source of contention between the two neighbors. Located
on the Vakhsh River tributary of the Amu Darya, the
completed dam will be the world’s tallest (335 m high,
1500mwide) containing a 17 billion squaremeter reservoir
(Trilling, 2009). Disagreements over the dam’s construction
have persisted, with Uzbekistan actively seeking to stall the
project. The ﬁnished damwould allow Tajikistan to control
downstream ﬂow of the Amu Darya, water vital for Uzbe-
kistan’s economy and what the state considers its nationalsecurity. In March 2010, Tajik ofﬁcials ﬁled an ofﬁcial note
of protest over the case of some 1000 rail freight cars bound
for Tajikistan being indeﬁnitely detained in Uzbekistan
territory. Tajik ofﬁcials claimed this action was meant to
delay construction of the Roghun Dam, as much of the
cargo was cement and other building materials bound for
this project. Uzbekistan ofﬁcials maintained that the freight
sequestration was necessary in order to fulﬁll a recent
agreement with NATO to allow supply shipments into
Afghanistan from the north (Kanagatuly, Sikorskaya,
Tokbaeva, & Olimova, 2010). For Tajikistan, the dam is ex-
pected to annually generate 3600 MW of electricity,
enough to provide both a domestic supply of power and
a much needed source of export earnings (Trilling, 2009).
An additional water-related dispute within the Aral Sea
region is ongoing between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
two downstream states, over the latter state’s Kara Kum
Canal. This massive unlined irrigation ditch diverts Amu
Darya water northwest through the length of
Turkmenistan, running nearly to the Caspian Sea. For this
largely desert state, the Kara Kum Canal (having been in
existence since the Stalin era) represents a lifeline,
supplying water for irrigation of its arid territory and
providing water to its capital Ashgabad and other cities.
Turkmenistan has announced plans to lengthen the canal
and to expand irrigation in the near future (Micklin, 2002).
Uzbekistan views the artiﬁcial canal as robbing its Kar-
akalpakistan autonomous republic of water, and as being
a major contributor to the desiccation of the Aral Sea
(Micklin, 2002). The overall acrimonious feelings of Kar-
akalpakistan residents toward Turkmenistan over Kara
Kum Canal water diversion was anecdotally substantiated
by the author’s discussion with Nukus (capital of Kar-
akalpakistan) residents during a trip to the area in summer
of 2007.
Of additional concern to Uzbekistan is the ongoing
construction (since 2000) of Turkmenistan’s Lake of the
Golden Century, an artiﬁcial water body being designed to
ﬁll much of a 3500–4000 square km depression in the
northwest Kara Kum desert (International Crisis Group,
2002). Turkmenistan claims the lake will be ﬁlled by
excess irrigation water and will not be maintained by the
Kara Kum Canal or Amu Darya River. Uzbekistan is highly
skeptical (as are others) that the lake will be solely main-
tained by irrigation runoff, and fears an increase in Turk-
menwater withdrawals. One additional point of contention
between the two states, of particular pertinence of this
paper’s focus, are the large number of ethnic Uzbeks
(approximately 1 million) living in the Dashaguz oblast
who would be dislocated by the lake once construction is
complete (International Crisis Group, 2002).
The conﬂict cases highlighted above are ongoing along
the Amu Darya River, with disputes between downstream
states, and an upstream and downstream state. The Syr
Darya basin has also had its share of disputes over water,
particularly between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over the
latter’s Toktogul reservoir and desire to increase its
production of hydro power (Weinthal, 2006). Nor have the
region’s two upstream states been immune to water
conﬂicts. In 2008 an international border incident occurred
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan over access to irrigation
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delimitation (Kadykeev & Majidova, 2008).
While interstate water disputes persist in Central Asia
the successful joint management of water resources to date
has stimulated hope for continued regional cooperation.
The absence of armed conﬂict over regional water has been
considered an indication of successful, peaceful coopera-
tion. In a 2007 conference commemorating the ﬁfteenth
anniversary of the ICWC’s formation, Loic Fauchon, presi-
dent of theWorldWater Council, prepared remarks lauding
regional interstate efforts (Dukhovny, 2007, p. 1):
“There are more than 260 transboundary basins in the
world. But very few examples where ﬁve states are
working together, hand-in-hand. Five States that are not
only dealing with planning and negotiation but also
with day-to-day management and functioning of two
weighty rivers: the Amudarya and the Syrdarya. Their
fruitful collaboration is the proof that, even if shared
water resources can generate divergences and even
conﬂicts, they are also a chance and a vector for
collaboration between States and enables to overcome
obstacles.”
The outlook for future cooperation may very well be
positive as the ﬁve states have a history of unity in water
management since the Soviet period, and the absolute
necessity of such collaboration is clear to all involved
(Micklin, 2002). In fact, cooperative action in regional water
management is deemed necessary for the region’s future
security and socio-economic well being (McKinney, 2004).
As unique historical and political nuances are key to the
emergence of conﬂict or cooperation among basin states
(Giordano, Giordano, & Wolf, 2002), the Aral Sea region’s
history of peaceful joint management of its water resources
may bode well for future cooperation.
The Aral Sea crisis additionally impacts the region’s
political scene through what Hanks (2000) refers to as
“environmental nationalism” (p. 949). This notion, as
applied to the Karakalpak ethnicity and the autonomous
region of Karakalpakistan (within Uzbekistan), essentially
amounts to a centripetal force uniting the Karakalpak
ethnic group. That is, the Aral Sea crisis and its concomitant
ecological and economic devastation, combined with the
disastrous health impacts facing the immediate region,
may very well unite the Karakalpaks, producing feelings of
nationalism. The crisis itself, having been the product of
decisions made by ‘outsiders’ from Moscow (during the
Soviet period) and Tashkent (since independence) can be
viewed as a perfect prescription for nationalistic feelings
among local Karakalpak residents (Critchlow, 1991). The
Aral crisis and its overall disastrous impact on the region
has, at least in part, resulted in the formation of Karakalpak
separatist movements, Khalk Mapi formed in the 1980s,
and more recently the nebulous Free Karakalpakistan
movement (Saidazimova, 2008). Lines of similarity have
been drawn between Karakalpakistan separatist senti-
ments and those within Xinjiang and Tibet in China and the
Caucasus’ South Ossetia (Sharipzhan, 2008), though much
less international attention has been given the Karakalpak
situation. Regardless, the central government in Tashkent
has been active, at times brutally, in suppressing any suchnationalist tendencies within Uzbekistan. Some claim that
natural resource endowments, as well as perceived oil and
gas deposits within the Autonomous Republic would
enable an independent Karakalpakistan to survive
(Shenker, 2009). In the foreseeable future, however, inde-
pendence for Karakalpakistan seems highly unlikely,
particularly given the ecological, social, and economic
devastation wrought by the Aral Sea crisis (Hanks, 2000).
One of the very pillars of Karakalpak nationalism, the
misery (economic underdevelopment, negative human
health effects) associated with the Aral Sea disaster, ironi-
cally puts any consideration of independence for the
republic in serious doubt.
4.4. Dimensional interrelationships
The previous discussion brought to light many elements
of the nature–society interrelationships operating today
within the Aral Sea region. For ease of presentation, these
links were organized into those existent within the
regional economy, human health, and political dimensions.
While presented individually, each of these spheres, and
importantly the nature–society interrelationships oper-
ating within them, are also closely linked and themselves
very much interrelated (Fig. 3). Presented here is a dia-
grammatic representation of the three spheres (regional
economy, human health, and political issues), selected
elements of the interrelationship between nature (N) and
society (S) within each, and the further interrelationships
between these dimensions.
Contemporary regional economic factors clearly impact
both human health and political considerations within the
region (i.e. unidirectional arrows emanating from the
regional economy dimension in Fig. 3). Manifestations of
the former include the continued salinization of water
supplies (and soils) stemming from the inefﬁcient irriga-
tion systems in place, as well as the continued prevalence
of agricultural chemicals within the region. Each of these
owes its origin to the economic pursuit of cotton. With
respect to the latter (economic inﬂuence on political
considerations within the region), the very impetus of
interstate political conﬂict over water stems from the
economic importance of the rivers, in addition to the
competing uses for them.
Political considerations impact fairly clearly both
human health and the regional economy in the Aral region.
With respect to the former, the newly independent states
seem unable to provide adequate health care, particularly
within the rural Aral Sea region. Health infrastructure is
woefully inadequate, and this population’s overall health
seems not to be a political priority. The decline of the
overall health care system in each of the regional states
after the collapse of the Soviet Union might also ﬁt in here.
Direct links to the latter (regional economy) primarily
result from state (particularly in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan) control, quotas, and subsidies in the cotton
sector. In addition, successful interstate cooperation over
the region’s water is essential for the functioning of the
regional economy.
Human health conditions within the Aral Sea region



























Fig. 3. Dimensional interrelationships in the Aral Sea region.
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negatively affects human capital stocks, and anecdotal
evidence of out-migration leaves the most vulnerable
population cohorts (i.e. those less equipped to be able to
improve their situation) behind. The miserable human
health conditions within the region, in conjunction with
the ecological devastation, can, and has, contributed to
nationalist sentiments and, in the case of Karakalpakistan,
regional secessionist movements.
5. Discussion
Within the Aral Sea region today, close nature–society
linkages exist within each of the additionally interrelated
three spheres discussed above (regional economy, political
considerations, and human health). In this way the region’s
human inhabitants and the natural, physical environment
can be viewed as a coupled human–environment system,
as expressed, for instance, by Turner et al. (2003). Others
(e.g. Liu et al., 2007; Monticino, Acevedo, Callicott, Cogdill,
& Lindquist, 2007) refer to such systems as coupled human
and natural systems, or even coupled human-biophysical
systems (e.g. Kotchen & Young, 2007). In an oft-cited
work illuminating complexities in coupled human-environment systems, Liu et al. (2007) identify a number
of elements common to a wide array of such systematic
couplings. Among these directly applicable to the Aral Sea
region include reciprocal effects, feedback loops, human-
aided resilience, and legacy effects.
Reciprocity and negative feedback abounds in today’s
Aral Sea region. At the most general level, human action
(intensive, unsustainable irrigation practices) has been
a dominant driver of the destruction of the Aral Sea and its
natural ecosystems. In a reciprocal negative feedback loop,
this ecosystem destruction has endangered the lives (and
livelihoods) of people living in the region. Diminished
ecosystem services, desiccation and desertiﬁcation,
contaminated air, water, and food chain, all signiﬁcantly
contribute to poor human health in the region. Other
diseases owe their origin to widespread poverty of the
region, resulting from the disappearing sea and its
commercial ﬁshing resource. Perhaps most dramatically,
the widespread (and ongoing) large scale application of
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and defoliants has resul-
ted in the concentration of toxic substances in the Aral Sea
region, amounting to a poisonous assault on local pop-
ulations through airborne chemical-laden dust, tainted
water sources, and contaminated food supply. Showing
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importance and political necessity of the cotton industry,
largely contributing to the Aral Sea crisis, exhibits
decreasing returns to scale as yields decrease with
increasing inputs, making a major causative factor in the
Aral crisis ultimately unsustainable.
The resilience of the northern, Little Aral (its recent
stabilization, apparent return of commercial ﬁsh species,
and improved climatic moderation function) has only been
enabled through massive human intervention. World Bank
funding, Kazakhstan government implementation, and
large scale dam and dyke construction projects reminiscent
of the Stalin-era remodeling of nature have made the
‘return’ of the Little Aral possible. Micklin (2007) presents
a multifaceted mitigating solution to at least stabilize what
remains of the Aral Sea, particularly the larger, southern
portion. This rehabilitation effort, on a much larger scale
than that which stabilized the northern portion, would also
require substantial human intervention, including
construction of a complex of dykes, dams, spillways, and
cement-lined canals. The resilience of the Aral Sea, indeed
its continued survival, will require substantial human
modiﬁcations of the natural (though greatly transformed
by human action) environment. Somewhat ironic is the fact
that large-scale human modiﬁcations of the natural envi-
ronment (Soviet-era irrigation construction projects)
largely contributed to the desiccation of the Aral Sea, and
now (as outlined by Micklin (2007)) are viewed as its only
realistically feasible salvation.
Legacy effects, those previous human–environment
interrelationships whose impacts are felt in subsequent
years, are additionally important elements of the Aral Sea
crisis. The Soviet efforts in drastically expanding irrigation
networks throughout the region followingWorldWar II did
not immediately, of course, show discernable negative
repercussions for the Aral Sea. In what Glantz (1999) refers
to as creeping environmental problems, these repercus-
sions, including the recession of the sea, diminished water
quality, and other environmental ills, didn’t become
evident for decades. Today, Soviet practices, especially in
the cotton sector, continue within the downstream
republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In these
instances, cotton is a major export revenue generator, and
each government centrally sets production quotas and
artiﬁcially low procurement prices. Inefﬁcient irrigation
infrastructures continue to waste water, and associated
reductions in soil quality force more and more applications
of agricultural chemicals and expansions in irrigated
acreage. Planned expansion of the Kara Kum canal and
completion of Lake of the Golden Century in Turkmenistan,
combined with planned expansion of irrigation in Uzbeki-
stan cast serious doubt on any future short-term savings of
water (a key component, incidentally, of the Micklin (2007)
Aral Sea rehabilitation plan).
The above discussion has attempted to situate the Aral
Sea crisis within the framework of the nascent coupled
human–environment system (or coupled human and
natural systems) analytical framework. The notion that an
interconnected relationship exists in the Aral Sea region, of
course, is not new. What Postel (2000) (whose quote
opened this paper) so aptly noted a decade ago remainstrue, and perhaps of greater consequence, today. The Aral
Sea crisis is indeed a most dramatic case, demonstrative of
the interrelationships between the region’s natural envi-
ronmental integrity and the well-being of its populace. The
nature–society linkages discussed in this paper have, in
part, attempted to substantiate this point. Natural envi-
ronmental elements in the Aral Sea region include the now-
fragmented sea itself, water (in the sea, the feeder rivers,
and groundwater), air, cotton (though with signiﬁcant
human inputs and modiﬁcations), and the surrounding
desert and steppe environments. Human elements include
the population, economic components including primary
sector dominance (agriculture) and irrigation infrastruc-
ture, and political actors and processes. Elements of the
human–environment interrelationship include the Aral
Sea’s desiccation, its lost climatic moderation function,
contaminated dust, agricultural chemical-laden air, sali-
nated and poisoned water supply, desertiﬁcation, political
and economic impetuses for the ensconced cotton industry,
and the desert’s high temperatures and aridity constraining
human activity.
A full understanding, recognition, or appreciation of the
complexities of these human–environment interrelation-
ships, by policy makers, international donor agencies, or
local residents, has not always been apparent. With such
a coupled, multi-element system, valuations and cost-
beneﬁt analyses are necessary and tradeoffs are inevi-
table. As the Aral Sea continues its retreat and the health of
the immediate region’s populations continues to worsen,
decision making to date has failed to assign valuations to
ensure natural environmental and social sustainability
within the immediate Aral Sea region. In a strong criticism
of the World Bank and its funding initiatives within the
region, Small and Bunce (2003) argue convincingly that
this international funding agency has failed, most notably
in its neglect to focus efforts aimed at reform of agricultural
production and the related inefﬁcient irrigation practices
(it would seem primarily within Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan). In other words, the World Bank has failed
to target a primary anthropogenic driver of the entire Aral
Sea disaster. The neglect of this essential link cannot be
blamed solely on the World Bank (or other international
donors) as the political will within the region’s largest
cotton producers, cotton exporters, and water consumers
(Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), to reform the agricultural
production sector, is glaringly absent (Weinthal, 2001).
It should be noted here that the ﬁve now independent
states in Central Asia share a number of contemporary
challenges. Landlocked and distant from major world
markets, the region’s situation is not ideal for global trade.
The inherited Soviet legacy, including ill-advised political
boundaries (particularly in the Ferghana Valley), command
economy structures, the woefully inefﬁcient irrigation
networks, and holdover vested political interests, makes
a transition to market orientation (to say nothing of
democratization), is a genuine challenge. Rapid population
growth in southern Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley
portions of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan make
regional food security a pressing issue. Recent political
instability in Kyrgyzstan (revolutions in 2005 and 2010,
June 2010 ethnic violence in the southern Osh region) has
K.D. White / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 18–33 31struck a palpable chord of fear within the political struc-
tures of each of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors that such instability
and violence could potentially spread across tenuous
international borders.
6. Conclusion
This paper’s purpose has been to elucidate the variety,
speciﬁcity, and directionality of nature–society linkages
operating within the Aral Sea region of Central Asia.
Particular emphasis has been placed on the contemporary
human–environment interrelationships which, in essence,
form a coupled human–environment system. The inextri-
cably linked nature of this system necessitates knowledge
and understanding of these interactions on the part of
policy makers within the region, as well as international
donor agencies wishing to positively address the decades-
long Aral Sea crisis. Of particular urgent need is reform of
a major anthropogenic driver of the Aral Sea disaster;
agricultural production (particularly cotton) and the
unsustainable irrigation practices anchoring this economic
sector. Such reform would also need to target the political
and economic factors promulgating the large scale
production of cotton, particularly in Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan.
The recent stabilization of the northern, Little Aral in
Kazakhstan offers a ﬂickering glimmer of hope, optimism
that Micklin (2007) has engendered in a plan to restore the
larger, southern portion of the Aral Sea. Similar to those
which were successful in ‘saving’ Kazakhstan’s Little Aral,
the Micklin plan would require herculean human inter-
vention unseenwithin the region since Stalin’s ‘remodeling
of nature.’ Nature–society linkages would also need to be
addressed, in particular the unsustainable withdrawals of
water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers.
Aside from being of academic interest to geographers
and others engaged within the burgeoning human–envi-
ronment coupled system research arena, the issues and
implications raised in this paper have unmistakable reso-
nance for the human inhabitants and ecological resilience
of the immediate Aral Sea region. Clearly as well, the
various interrelationships discussed here have salient
resonance for those concerned with the political develop-
ments and socio-economic development issues within the
larger Central Asia region. Furthermore, as Aral Sea dust is
carried into Russia and China, as fears of remnant Soviet-
era biological weapon agents exist, and as water scarcity
and food insecurity fan political unrest, the issues high-
lighted here have global signiﬁcance as well.
For the people of Kyzlorda oblast (Kazakhstan), Dasha-
guz oblast (Turkmenistan), and particularly the autono-
mous republic of Karakalpakistan (Uzbekistan), the Aral Sea
crisis representsmuchmore than an isolated photograph of
a rusting desert-bound vessel appearing in an introductory
geography or environmental studies textbook. For these
people, the crisis has meant a destruction of their economic
livelihoods as well as an unwelcomed assault on their
health conditions. The ecological tragedy of the Aral Sea is
well known and oft-studied. The human tragedy, perhaps
a bit less known and studied, seems equally as ominous.
The massive human transformations and alterations thatcreated the crisis are ironically the very anthropogenic
drivers that can save the Aral Sea. This paper, if nothing
else, represents an impassioned call, emanating from
a geographer based in the Central Asia region, for a recon-
sideration of the contemporary nature–society linkages
inherent in the Aral Sea region. Clearly a value shift is in
order, with ecological and local human condition values
raised vis-à-vis the economic and political imperatives
which have traditionally won out. The urgency is unmis-
takable – the Aral Sea region’s ecological and social
sustainability is at stake.References
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